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 Constitutional Cheap Shots: Targeting Undocumented Residents 
With the Second Amendment 
Matthew Blair1 
I. Introduction 
illegal aliens are those who ... are likely to maintain no permanent address in this 
country, elude detection through an assumed identity, and-already living outside the 
law- resort to illegal activities to maintain a livelihood .... one seeking to arrange an 
assassination would be especially eager to hire someone who had little commitment to 
this nation's political institutions and who could disappear afterwards without a trace. 2 
In June 2011 , the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, motivated apparently at least in part by 
this fear of ninja-like noncitizen assassins, ruled that undocwnented residents lack Second 
Amendment rights under the federal Constitution. Although the 1986 amendments to the federal 
Omnibus Crime Control Act denied undocwnented residents the right to bear anns3, this ruling 
nevertheless broke new ground in the federal circuits by virtue of the way that it arrived at its 
conclusion. Circuit Judge Garwood's majority opinion upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 922(g)(5) by declaring that undocwnented residents are not to be considered "people" for 
the purposes of the Second Amendment.4 Though undoubtedly certain court watchers will 
1 J.D., 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2007, College of William and Mary. I would like to thank 
Professor John Wefing in advance for his certification that this paper meets the Advanced Writing Requirement. I 
would also like to thank the Academy. 
2 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2011), as revised (June 29, 2011), citing United States 
v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128- 29 (2d Cir.I984). 
3 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (West); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); See also Scott Jacobs, Toward 
A More Reasonable Approach to Gun Control: Canada As A Model, 15 N. Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L. 315, 328-
29 (1995X"The 1986 amendments expanded the classes of persons prohibited from selling, shipping, or receiving 
firearms to include illegal aliens, veterans who had received a dishonorable discharge, and persons who had 
renounced their U.S. citizenship.") 
4 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442 (5th Cir. 2011 ). 
consider this ruling to have some net positive effect on American society, this Note suggests that 
the decision in United States v. Portillo-Munoz has misinterpreted the recent guidance of the 
United States Supreme Court regarding gun rights, and that this confusion will open up the door 
to further uncertainty of the constitutional rights of undocumented persons in the United States. 
This Note will argue for the necessity of resolving that uncertainty. 
II. Background 
On July 10, 2010, Armando Portillo-Munoz, a ranch hand, was "spinning around" on his 
motorcycle in Dimmit, Texas, when he was approached by the police.5 The police officers found 
a .22 caliber handgun in his vehicle, and a dollar bill with a white powdery substance inside the 
folds. 6 Portillo-Munoz admitted to being a citizen of Mexico who was illegally present in the 
United States. He was arrested and charged with unlawfully carrying a weapon and for 
possession of a controlled substance.7 Prior to this arrest, Portillo-Munoz had obtained the gun 
to help him protect the chickens on the ranch from coyotes. 8 He was sentenced to ten months' 
imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. 9 
On appeal, Portillo argued that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), a federal gun 
law, violated his right under the Second Amendment. 10 The United States Code provision states 
that it is "unlawful for any person ... who, being an alien ... illegally or unlawfully in the United 
5 Id at 438. 
6 Id at 438. 
7 Jd at 438. 
8 !d. at 439. 
9 ld at 439. 
10 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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States ... to ... possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any 
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce. "
11 Portillo argued that this law conflicts with the Second Amendment, which 
provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."12 Portillo further argued that, despite 
his illegal status, he should count as a member of "the people" in constitutional parlance. 13 He 
argued that the Supreme Court had in the past defined the concept of "people" to include more 
than just the nation's citizenry14, and that the Fifth Circuit itself had previously employed a 
broader test to determine what "people" were due the Fourth Amendment's similarly-worded 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 15 
As a matter of first impression in the federal circuits, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)( 5), the provision of the law which was applicable to 
noncitizens present in the country illegally. 16 The court based its holding primarily on the recent 
Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller17, which held that the Second Amendment 
"conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms," independent from a person's involvement 
in a militia. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Heller, stated: "And whatever else it leaves 
to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
11 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(5). 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
13 Brief for Petitioner at 10, United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F .3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011 )(No. No. 11-1 0086). 
14 Id at 12. 
15 ld at 11. 
16 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442. 
17 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
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responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home."18 However, while the effect of 
the Heller decision was to overrule certain gun restrictions in the District of Columbia, the Court 
took care to confine the scope of its decision to those who would have been denied firearms prior 
to its holding.19 The Court stated that "nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, 
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."20 In a footnote 
to this statement, the Court added that those were identified "only as examples" and that the "list 
does not purport to be exhaustive."21 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, based on the recent Heller decision, any 
Second Amendment rights now available to American citizens should remain foreclosed to 
undocumented residents like Portillo-Munoz?2 The court specifically stated that the "language 
in Heller invalidates Portillo's attempt to extend the protections of the Second Amendment to 
undocumented residents. Undocumented residents are not 'law-abiding, responsible citizens' or 
'members of the political community."'23 The court stated that the Heller decision, in addition to 
affirming the Second Amendment as an individual right, also had the effect of reinterpreting the 
18 Id at 635. 
19 See id: "In sum, we hold that the District's ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second 
Amendment .... Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the 
District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home." 
20 Id at 626-27. 
21 Id at n. 26. 
22 See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
23 Id at 440, citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 644. 
4 
meaning of the phrase "the people," at least for purposes of the Second Amendment.24 The 
Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Supreme Court's prior interpretation of the word 
"people" in the context of the Fourth Amendment25 had "indicated that the same analysis would 
extend to the text of the Second Amendment."26 Nevertheless, the court declined to analogize 
the identical wording of the two amendments, instead declaring, "The Second Amendment grants 
an affirmative right to keep and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a 
protective right against abuses by the government. "27 Based on this perception of a dichotomy 
between the two amendments, as well as its citizen-focused interpretation of the Heller decision, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply the broader definition of "the people" that 
was embraced by the most on-point Supreme Court case, United States v. Verdugo--Urquidez?8 
The majority in United States v. Verdugo--Urquidez held that the Fourth Amendment's 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not implicated by a search that occurs 
outside of the nation's borders and targets a nonresident alien.29 In this case, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency arrested a Mexican citizen who was believed to be a leader of a large and 
violent narcotrafficking operation.30 Verdugo-Urquidez was arrested in his own country by 
Mexican police officers, and transported to California, where he was arrested by United States 
24 I d. at 440. 
25 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated .... ) with U.S. CONST. amend. II(" ... the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed"). 
26 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
27 I d. at 440. 
28 I d. at 440. 
29 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990). 
30 I d. at 262. 
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marshals and held for trial.31 American and Mexican police officers searched his house in 
Mexico without a warrant, and Verdugo-Urquidez sought to have the incriminating documents 
suppressed from his trial in the United States?2 
The majority of the Supreme Court found that Verdugo-Urquidez did not qualify as one 
of "the people" protected by the "Fourth Amendment [nor] the First and Second 
Amendments."33 However, a plurality of the Court did not make that determination based solely 
on the defendant's want of United States citizenship; rather, the Court stated that he could not be 
considered one of "the people" because he was not part of the "class of persons who are part of a 
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to 
be considered part of that community."34 Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but expressed 
dissatisfaction that the majority was focusing on the defendant's status, and not the government's 
conduct.35 However, the majority did not seem eager to apply that test to aliens who reside in the 
country illegally, and in fact, seemed to back away from prior case law that had assumed that 
illegally-residing aliens would have Fourth Amendment rights.36 Nevertheless, having just 
propounded a test based on sufficient connections, the Court was unwilling to carve out a special 
exception for illegally-residing aliens in the United States who in many cases may have been 
31 ld at 262. 
32 ld at 262-63. 
33 Jd at 265. 
34 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
35 See id at 276 ("Given the history of our Nation's concern over warrantless and unreasonable searches, explicit 
recognition of 'the right of the people' to Fourth Amendment protection may be interpreted to underscore the 
importance of the right, rather than to restrict the category of persons who may assert it.")(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
36 Jd at 272 ("Our statements in Lopez-Mendoza are therefore not dispositive of how the Court would rule on a 
Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States if such a claim were squarely before us.") 
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able to show sufficient connections to the country. In the end, the Court neither affirmatively 
granted the Fourth Amendment right to undocumented residents, nor did it categorically bar 
them from the constitutional provision. 37 
Twenty-one years later, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Portillo-Munoz interpreted 
the Heller decision as clarifying the Verdugo-Urquidez standard of "sufficient connection" in 
regard to undocumented residents.38 Prior to Heller, a court may have inquired into the 
connections of an alien, resident or otherwise, to determine if he was sufficiently connected to 
the United States to be part of the national community.39 However, the Portillo-Munoz court 
interpreted Heller as closing the door to any claims brought by undocumented United States 
residents. Though Heller quotes verbatim the Verdugo- Urquidez standard of the "class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that community,"40 Justice Scalia on the 
same page paraphrases the quote when he restates that "the people", as a term of art, 
"unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset."41 
Based on this pronouncement, the Portillo-Munoz court stated that the sufficient connections test 
of the Fourth Amendment would not be applicable to an alien illegally present in the United 
37 ld at 272-3. ("Even assuming such aliens would be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, their situation is 
different from respondent's. The illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States voluntarily and 
presumably had accepted some societal obligations; but respondent had no voluntary connection with this country 
that might place him among "the people" of the United States.") 
38 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
39 See for example Doe v. United States, 2010 WL 4852390 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 10, 2010); Veiga v. World 
Meteorological Org., 568 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) a.ff'd sub nom. Veiga v. World Meteorological 
Organisation, 368 F. App'x 189 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1265 (D. 
Utah 2003) affd, 386 F.3d 953 (lOth Cir. 2004). 
40 Heller, 554 U.S. at 580, quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
41 Id. at 580. 
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States.42 This limitation on the sufficient connections test, coupled with the Supreme Court's 
reference in Heller to citizens43, foreclosed any previously-held possibility that Mr. Portillo-
Munoz is a member of "the people" for purposes of either the Second or Fourth Amendment. 
III. Analysis 
Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has now held that undocumented residents 
lack Second Amendment rights based on the Heller decision, a closer reading of Heller shows 
that it does not support that proposition. The judgment that aliens residing in the country ~ ( 
illegally should not have access to firearms is not aj\reasonable proposition. However, any 
decision that results in that disallowance must be the product of careful weighing of the relevant 
government and societal interests at stake. It cannot be the result of simply a blanket policy of 
excluding all rights and privileges to those who lack documentation in our country. And 
certainly, mere constitutional semantics should not control the outcome when several 
fundamental rights are at stake. The Heller decision, which expanded the Second Amendment as 
an individual right to self-defense, cannot also be plausibly used to curtail that same right for 
undocumented residents. 
A. The text of Heller does not support a narrower reading of "the people" 
The Fifth Circuit court emphasized the importance of the language in Heller, and points 
to two examples in the Heller decision in which the word choice used rules out undocumented 
42 See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (" ... neither this court nor the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment extends to a native and citizen of another nation who entered and remained in the United States 
illegally."). 
43 See id. at 440, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635: "The Court held the Second Amendment 'surely elevates above all 
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home."' 
8 
residents.44 Specifically, the court points to the Scalia majority's use of the phrases "law-
abiding, responsible citizens"45 and "members of the political community"46 to establish the 
proposition that, according to Heller, a person cannot be a member of"the people" unless he is 
also a citizen. The Fifth Circuit court reinforced this idea by concluding: "Aliens who enter or 
remain in this country illegally and without authorization are not Americans as that word is 
commonly understood. "47 
The Portillo-Munoz majority offers no further guidelines on who is "commonly 
understood" to be an American. Nor does it offer any textual support for this declaration, 
leaving the skeptical reader with a sneaking suspicion that the common understanding is 
common only to the opinions of three circuit judges. One could presume that the judges are 
referring to those who have United States citizenship. However, the phrases from Heller that the 
majority cites do not simply state that the person who qualifies as a member must be simply a 
citizen. Instead, the citizen must also be "law-abiding" and "responsible," and should also be a 
"member of the political community[.]" Although "law-abiding certainly corresponds to the 
current law that prohibits felons from gun ownership 48, it is hard to translate the other two 
characteristics into workable tests for who should be allowed a gun. "R~sponsible" is a highly 
44 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
45 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635: "The Court held the Second Amendment 'surely elevates above all other interests the 
right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense ofhearth and home."' 
46 See id at 580: "What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention "the people," the term 
unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset." 
47 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
48 18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(5). 
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subjective characteristic, and is also not necessarily correlated with gun ownership at all.49 
Similarly, no one contends that being a member of a political community, i.e., voting, should be 
one of the determinants for gun access. So then why are courts so quick to conflate citizenship 
with Second Amendment rights? 
The other major problem with equating just a few words with a new constitutional rule is 
that words are often ambiguous. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines "citizen" 
in its first definition as "an inhabitant of a city or (often) of a town; esp. one possessing civic 
rights and privileges, a burgess or freeman of a city"; then as "a townsman, as opposed to a 
countryman"; and finally, a "civilian as distinguished from a soldier; in earlier times also 
distinguished from a member of the landed nobility or gentry."50 Only then does the dictionary, 
in its second definition, turn to what the Portillo-Munoz majority emphasizes is the correct 
interpretation: "A member of a state, an enfranchised inhabitant of a country, as opposed to an 
alien .... "51 The distinction between "citizen" meaning "person who possesses United States 
citizenship" and "citizen" meaning "everyday person" should not come as a surprise to anyone 
who is accustomed to reading bombastic Supreme Court decisions 52, especially those written by 
49 Garen J. Wintemute. Association between firearm ownership, frrearm-related risk and risk reduction behaviours 
and alcohol-related risk behaviours. Injury Prevention- British Medical Journals (Jun. 13, 2011). 
http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/early/2011/06/13/ip.2010.031443.abstract. (fmding that gun owners are 
twice as likely to participate in binge drinking, chronic heavy drinking, and drinking and driving than are non-gun 
owners). 
50 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 249 (2d. ed. 1989). 
51 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 250 (2d. ed. 1989). 
52 See e.g. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)("Patently offensive, indecent material presented over 
the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's 
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.")(Emphasis added). 
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Justice Scalia. 53 The word "citizen" may sometimes resonate with more patriotism and 
grandiosity than its simpler, yet more accurate counterpart, "person." However, that does not 
necessarily mean that the Court was intending to equate the two concepts. 
A survey of numerous other majority opinions authored by Justice Scalia reveals a 
pattern of similar rhetoric, in which "citizen" does not denote anything other than a simple 
inhabitant of the United States. In Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council54, for example, Justice 
Scalia states, "This accords, we think, with our 'takings' jurisprudence, which has traditionally 
been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power 
over, the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they obtain title to property."55 One who 
performs even a cursory survey of Justice Scalia's past majority opinions is sure to find that this 
overbroad use of "citizen" is not an uncommon turn of the phrase. 56 Patriotically-spirited as it 
may be, it is not to be taken literally as a constitutional test. 
53 See e.g. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia Objects. N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:40PM), 
http:/ I opinionator .blogs.nytimes.com/20 11103/09/justice-scalia-objects/. 
54 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
55 /d. at 1027 (emphasis added). 
56 See e.g. Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,2755, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011) ("The Republic 
would require virtuous citizens, which necessitated proper training from childhood."); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. 
Ct. 2074,2086 (2011)( "For example, a law-abiding citizen might observe a crime during the days or weeks before a 
scheduled flight abroad."); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 170 (2008)("Moreover, even though several state 
constitutions also prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures, citizens who claimed officers had violated state 
restrictions on arrest did not claim that the violations also ran afoul of the state constitutions."); Hudson v. Michigan, 
547 U.S. 586 (2006)("The interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule include human life and limb (because 
an unannounced entry may provoke violence from a surprised resident), property (because citizens presumably 
would open the door upon an announcement, whereas a forcible entry may destroy it), and privacy and dignity"); 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001)(" It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured 
to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997)("The Constitution thus contemplates that a State's government will represent and 
remain accountable to its own citizens."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 592 (1992)("Similarly, 
[petitioners'] professional backgrounds in wildlife preservation ... also make it likely-at least far more likely than 
for the average citizen-that they would choose to visit these areas of the world where species are vanishing."); 
11 
To find support for the idea that the word "citizen" cannot always be taken at face value, 
one merely needs to examine other uses of the word "citizen" in the Heller decision to see if the 
word is interchangeable with the phrase "person with United States citizenship". For example, 
the opinion at one point states: "The District [of Columbia] law, by contrast, far from imposing a 
minor fine, threatens citizens with a year in prison (five years for a second violation) for even 
obtaining a gun in the first place."57 If we use the strict reading of"citizen" that the Fifth Circuit 
requires, then the statement then reads: "The District law ... threatens persons with United States 
citizenship with a year in prison .... " Since the District of Columbia statute does not in fact 
threaten only bona fide citizens with such a punishment (the actual language uses the word 
"person"58), one cannot escape the impression that Justice Scalia has used the word "citizen" for 
the purpose of rhetorical flourish at least once during his opinion. A similar example can be 
found where the opinion states: "Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the 
right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First 
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose. "59 Again, Justice Scalia 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)("Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a "show of 
authority" is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, 
but whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person."); City of Columbia v. 
Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 368 (1991)("COA was not alone in urging this course; concerned about 
the city's recent explosion of billboards, a number of citizens including writers of articles and editorials in local 
newspapers advocated restrictions."); Griffm v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987)("Although a probation officer 
is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary 
citizen.")( emphases added) 
57 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
58 See D.C. Code§ 7-2507.06: "A person who ... possesses a pistol, or firearm that could otherwise be registered, 
shall be fmed not more than $1,000 or imprisoned .... " 
59 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
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could not have intended for that one sentence to establish that the First Amendment protects only 
the right of persons with United States citizenship to speak for any purpose. 60 
Even if we assume that the Heller Court intended for the language in its opinion to be 
taken literally, we still encounter logistical problems. Assuming for the sake of argument that 
Heller actually does hold that~ onl~s with United States citizenship should be 
allowed guns, a conflict arises when this new pronouncement is read against 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)( 5), the federal firearms law of which Portillo-Munoz ran afoul. The Code provision 
states that it is "unlawful for any person ... who, being an alien ... illegally or unlawfully in the 
United States ... to ... possess ... any firearm or ammunition .... "61 If Heller restricts guns to 
United States citizens, and§ 922(g)(5) allows guns to any alien who is not in the country 
illegally, then the two in conjunction have created a twilight zone of gun legality for the nation's 
12.5 million legal permanent residents (those immigrants who are lawfully in the country but do 
not have citizenship).62 Far from being hypothetical, this issue has already come up multiple 
times in federal court, and for the concerned legal permanent resident who may or may not have 
now committed a felony under this holding, this uncertainty can spell out the difference between 
deportation and eventual full citizenship rights. 63 
60 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945)("But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he 
becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include 
those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."). 
61 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), 
62 See Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2009, Department of Homeland 
Security (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lpr_pe_2009.pdf. 
63 See e.g. United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1513 (lOth Cir. 1990)("Because aliens in the process of 
applying for legalization of their immigration status may not be deported, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160(d) & 1255a(e), they are 
not unlawfully in the United States and thereby subject to prosecution under§ 922(a)(6)"). See also United States v. 
13 
B. The text of Heller is not a constitutional test for noncitizens 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is the first federal appellate level court to review the 
constitutionality of§ 922(g)(5), pertaining to aliens unlawfully in the country.64 A number of 
district courts have already upheld§ 922(g)(5) as constitutional post-Heller.65 The primary 
rationale in these cases has been split into two camps: those courts that have upheld the 
disallowance of alien gun rights based on the presumed constitutionality of§ 922(g)(5)66, and 
those courts that have upheld the disallowance by holding that undocumented residents are not 
members of "the people" of the Second Amendment. 67 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals based 
its holding on the latter reasoning, which misconstrues precedent and creates a much more 
precarious constitutional position for undocumented residents in the Fifth Circuit. 
Brissett, 720 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D. Tex. 1989)(holding alien whose application for legalization was pending at the 
time he purchased frrearm could not be prosecuted under§ 922(g)(5)). 
64 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439. 
65 See United States v. Flores-Higuera, No. 1:11-CR-182-TCB-CCH, 2011 WL 3329286 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2011) 
(listing eight cases upholding§ 922(g)(5) prior to July 2011). 
66 See e.g. United States v. Flores, No. 10-178 JNE JSM, 2010 WL 4720223 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2010)("Even if 
illegal aliens fall within the ambit of the Second Amendment, § 922(g)(5)(A) is constitutional as a "presumptively 
lawful regulatory measure" prohibiting the possession of frrearms.") 
67 See e.g. United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010)(" 
First, the defendant has not shown that as an illegal alien he has any Second Amendment rights, before or after 
Heller. Plaintiff has not shown that illegal aliens are among "the people" contemplated by the Second 
Amendment.") 
14 
The constitutional rights afforded to noncitizens both today and in the history of the 
United States can be described as murky at best. 68 However, a brief summary can still establish 
why Heller did not establish a new constitutional test. 
The Supreme Court has stated for more than a century that it will grant great deference to 
acts of Congress in the immigration sphere69 in what has come to be referred to as the "plenary 
power doctrine." At the same time, the Court has also made it clear that it will still consider 
itself competent to weigh in on some of the more fundamental constitutional issues involving 
noncitizens in the United States. 70 Since 1886, the Supreme Court has recognized both that 
noncitizens do have due process rights under the Fourteen Amendment and that the judiciary has 
authority to rule on those claims. 71 In recent years, the Supreme Court has continued to expand 
the applicability of due process claims. In Plyler v. Doe72, the Court overturned a Texas law that 
barred undocumented children from attending public schools. Again ruling on the paramount 
68 See Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of Rights from Chinese Exclusion to Guantanamo, 20 
BERKELEYLARAzA L.J. 89, 90 (2010X" ... a closer examination of the century-old jurisprudence suggests that the 
spectrum itself is replete with inconsistencies and is utterly disordered."). 
69 See e.g. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)(" Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the 
political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."); see also Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889)("When once it is established that congress possesses the 
power to pass an act, our province ends with its construction and its application to cases as they are presented for 
determination."). 
70 See e.g. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,940-41 (1983)("The plenary authority of Congress over aliens ... is not 
open to question, but what is challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means 
of implementing that power."). 
71 See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903)(" But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as 
holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may 
disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process of law' as understood at the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)(" The fourteenth amendment to the constitution 
is not confmed to the protection of citizens ... These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons 
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality ... "). 
72 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,207 (1982). 
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importance of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated "[w]hatever his status under the 
immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term."73 The 
Brennan majority vindicated the principle that, in addition to the traditional due process 
guarantees to all persons inside the United States, the equal protection clause would also provide 
constitutional safeguards to a person regardless of their immigration status. 74 The majority 
pressed forward, also stating: 
In concluding that 'all persons within the territory of the United States,' including 
aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to 
challenge actions of the Federal Government, we reasoned from the 
understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford its 
protection to all within the boundaries of a State. 75 
The Plyler decision represents the Court's reaffirmation of the inviolability of certain rights-
namely, the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments- that apply without regard to the status of 
the person seeking the protection. 
As the Due Process Clause also incorporates those provisions of the Bill of Rights to the 
individual states 76, the Fourteenth Amendment has also served as a vehicle to afford noncitizens 
other constitutional protections. 77 For example, the Supreme Court held more then a half-
73 /d. at 210. 
74 /d. at 212., quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution is not confmed to the protection of citizens .... and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the 
protection of equal laws."). 
75 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 212, citing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. 
76 See e.g. Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982)(" Justice Brennan advocated 
adoption of what is now commonly described as the "selective incorporation" theoty of the fourteenth amendment. 
That theory, simply put, holds that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause fully incorporates all of those 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights deemed to be fundamental and thereby makes those guarantees applicable to the 
states."). 
77 See e.g. Bridges v. State of Cal., 314 U.S. 252,280 (1941)("Which one ofthe various limitations upon state 
power introduced by the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs the First ... Only the Due Process Clause assures 
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century ago that noncitizens have free speech rights under the First Amendment. 78 Noncitizens 
have also been historically protected by the Fourth Amendment. In I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza79, 
the Supreme Court considered whether the exclusionary rule was required to correct Fourth 
Amendment violations in deportation proceedings. While the Court ultimately held that the 
Fourth Amendment remedy was unnecessary because it was not a criminal trial, it decided the 
case explicitly under the impression that aliens possess Fourth Amendment rights. 80 The Court 
specifically stated: "Important as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons, 
there is no convincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation 
proceedings will contribute materially to that end." Far from being a groundbreaking holding, 
the case merely reaffirmed the strong undercurrent of jurisprudence that, even though the remedy 
for a Fourth Amendment violation may be up for debate, the right itself is not. Other courts have 
affirmed the notion that the Fourth Amendment applies to the government and is not concerned 
with the status of the person seeking its protection.81 The right attaches even when the person is 
constitutional protection of civil liberties to aliens and corporations.") See also Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d I085, 
I 087 (7th Cir. I977)(" A lawfully admitted resident alien, of course, is a person within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ... Therefore, he enjoys the protection of those amendments in the Bill of Rights which are 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment so as to be applicable to the states, at least in matters wholly 
unrelated to immigration and naturalization."). 
78 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, I48 (I945) ("Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in 
this country."). 
79 I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. I032, I046 (1984). 
80 See id. at I 046 (emphasis added). 
81 See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,273 (1973)("In the absence of probable cause or 
consent, that search violated the petitioner's [a Mexican citizen with a valid United States work permit] Fourth 
Amendment right to be free ofunreasonable searches and seizures."); See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,247 
(I960)("This is a protection given not only to citizens but to aliens as well, as the opinion of the Court by 
implication holds. The right 'of the people' covered by the Fourth Amendment certainly gives security to aliens in 
the same degree that 'person' in the Fifth and 'the accused' in the Sixth Amendments also protects them.")(Douglas, 
J., dissenting); See Au Yi Lau v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 2I7, 223 (D.C. Cir. 
197I)("Since aliens in this country are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment in common with citizens, such a reading 
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in the country illegally: "An alien within the United States has standing to assert a violation of 
constitutional rights even if his presence is illegal ... The Government here does not suggest that 
appellee is not entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protection as are citizens."82 
However, in 1990, the Supreme Court's decision in Verdugo-Urquidez, demanded a 
reexamination of its past holdings regarding noncitizens and the Fourth Amendment. It can be 
seen as representing both a step forward and a step back for undocumented residents seeking 
constitutional parity with United States citizens. On one hand, it did clearly establish a definition 
of"the people" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, as well as the First and Second 
Amendments. 83 The Court stated, without mentioning any citizenship requirement, that "the 
people" "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have 
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community."84 The Court further held that Verdugo-Urquidez was not a member of the "people" 
because as an alien who had not come here willingly, he had "no previous significant voluntary 
connection with the United States .... "85 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment did not apply to him. 
However, the Court refused to acknowledge the inescapable conclusion that, under its 
new holding, an undocumented resident could establish a Fourth Amendment right provided that 
of the Congressional mandate must be controlled by the constitutional standards governing similar detentions made 
by other law enforcement officials .... "; See Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979)("Thus, even though 
the suppression of evidence may be the most cumbersome and unproven tool of deterrence, it is the approach most 
likely to be pursued by an alien whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated because of its "windfall" 
effect."). 
82 United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1975). 
83 See Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
84 Id at 265. 
85 ld. at 271. 
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he or she meet could establish a sufficient connection with the community. Additionally, the 
Court tried to undo the scope of several decades of precedent by reopening the question of 
previously settled law regarding the universality of the Fourth Amendment. The plurality 
opinion stated that the Lopez-Mendoza case decided five years earlier86, which presumed that 
undocumented residents could have violable Fourth Amendment rights did not in fact decide 
whether the Fourth Amendment could even apply to the undocumented residents. The Court 
stated that even though "a majority of Justices assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to 
undocumented residents in the United States ... our decision did not expressly address the 
proposition gleaned by the court below."87 This clever bit of revisionist jurisprudence allowed 
the Court to reinvent the wheel, and produce the substantial connections test, which would 
subsequently govern the decision of who could now be afforded the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The previous section is intended to support the proposition that noncitizens have 
traditionally been covered by many of the provisions of the Constitution. The Due Process 
Clause, which applies in full force even to those in the country illegally88, has incorporated the 
majority of the Bill of Rights to the States, and most recently the Second Amendment itself.89 
86 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
87 Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272. ("The question presented for decision in Lopez-Mendoza was limited to 
whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should be extended to civil deportation proceedings; it did not 
encompass whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to illegal aliens in this country.") 
88 See e.g. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,77 (1976)("There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of 
the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons 
from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... Even one whose presence in this country 
is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.")( emphasis added). 
89 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050, (20 1 O)("Unless considerations of stare decisis counsel 
otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective 
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Because of this concern over the fundamentality of due process rights, the Supreme Court has 
afforded noncitizens other rights like the First and Fourth Arnendments.90 It is worth noting here 
that the First Amendment, like the Fourth Amendment, contains identical wording to that of the 
Second Amendment in describing the "people" to whom it applies. The Supreme Court itself 
recognized the congruence of these amendments when it lumped them together in the Verdugo-
Urquidez decision, referring to the '"the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the 
First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and 
Tenth Arnendments"91 without distinction. Absent any other textual distinction, "the people" in 
one amendment surely means the "the people", as both commonsense and the Supreme Court 
recognize. And that the definition of "the people", the Court went on, "refers to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that community." 
Therefore, if the Portillo-Muniz court were correct in interpreting Heller as removing 
noncitizens from the category of "people" in the Bill of Rights, then the logical implication of 
this revelation is that the Court did not simply take away the Second Amendment from 
noncitizens, but also the longstanding protections of the First and Fourth Amendments. The 
Supreme Court clearly did not intend for such wide-reaching implications for so many 
applies equally to the Federal Government and the States ... We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller."). 
90 See e.g. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945). 
91 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,265 (1990). 
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constitutional rights. So then what is the appropriate test for determining who has Second 
Amendment rights? 
C. Five Tests for Determining Who Should Obtain Second Amendment Rights 
Today the Second Amendment's right to bear arms is foreclosed to an undocumented 
resident. Some courts considering the constitutionality of § 922(g)( 5) have upheld the federal 
law as a presumptively valid exercise of congressional power.92 Some, like the Portillo-Munoz 
court, have gone so far as to say that those undocumented residents are not "people" at all for the 
purposes of the Bill of Rights, and have ruled on that basis.93 However, neither route is ideal. 
The first rationale seems less than reasonable when one considers that the original intent of the 
firearm ban was to keep guns out of the hands of people who are dangerous to society. 94 The 
second line of thinking, involving a perversion of the word "people" is equally unsatisfactory 
because of its incongruence with past Supreme Court precedent. 
A survey of the law indicates that there are at least four other potential tests for 
determining who should be afforded Second Amendment and other constitutional rights. These 
are: the "sufficient connection" test developed by the Verdugo- Urquidez plurality; the 
"governed" test of the Verdugo- Urquidez dissent; the test of the "active vs. passive right", 
espoused by the Portillo-Munoz court; and the intermediate scrutiny test. Two propositions are 
92 See United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, No. 3:08-CR-145-MR-DCK-1, 2008 WL 4539663 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 
2008)("Although the Court need not look beyond Heller in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, it is important to 
note that the Fourth Circuit has addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) on several occasions and 
squarely rejected each challenge. See United States v. Wells (rejecting Commerce Clause argument); United States 
v. Bostic (rejecting Tenth Amendment argument); United States v. Mitchell (rejecting Fifth Amendment Due 
Process claim)( citations omitted). 
93 See United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010)("Plaintiff 
has not shown that illegal aliens are among "the people" contemplated by the Second Amendment."). 
94 See e.g. Scarborough v. U. S., 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977). 
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not discussed here - that undocumented residents should not receive any constitutional 
protections; or alternatively, that the Second Amendment is not applicable to anyone outside of a 
militia context. Despite the strength of the argument for at least one of these propositions95, 
neither are viable constitutional positions today in light of both longstanding96 and more recent97 
cases. 
The remaining tests will be examined based on their consistency and fairness. Although 
this author does subscribe to a preferred test, the following Section is not written to advance any 
one point of view. Instead, it exists to show that there are a wide variety of approaches available 
which take into account the complex nature of one's rights and status in society, and go beyond 
the notion of constitutional rights as a zero-sum game, with citizens alone taking all the 
wtnntngs. 
A. Sufficient connections test- Verdugo- Urquidez plurality 
In deciding that a Mexican citizen would not have any Fourth Amendment protection in 
his home outside the United States, the Verdugo- Urquidez plurality held that a person is only a 
member of the people if he can be classified as being a member of "a class of persons who are 
95 See e.g. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)("In the absence of any evidence tending to show that 
possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some 
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second 
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is net within judicial notice that 
this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.); 
See also David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REv. 
588, 589 (2000)("The question at the heart of this debate is whether the Amendment restricts the government's 
ability to regulate the private possession of firearms. Since at least 1939-- when the Supreme Court decided United 
States v. Miller, its only decision squarely addressing the scope of the right to "keep and bear Arms"-- the answer to 
that question has been an unqualified "no." Courts have brushed aside Second Amendment challenges to gun control 
legislation, reading the Amendment to forbid only laws that interfere with states' militias."). 
96 See e.g. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
97 See e.g. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
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part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this 
country to be considered part of that community."98 The Court also suggested that this test 
would apply with equal force to other similarly-worded amendments, including the Second 
Amendment.99 
One might commend this decision as an arguably sensible compromise to constitutional 
rights for aliens- namely, that an undocumented resident, despite his lack of official entry, may 
be properly viewed as a member of the community. This standard reflects the rational view that 
not all aliens are created equal, and that an undocumented alien who lives in the United States, 
holds a job, and pays Social Security taxes for any amount of time should not be automatically 
grouped with a drug runner who has not voluntarily entered the country. 100 The former promotes 
some benefit to the community101 ; the other certainly does not. This view reflects a realistic 
notion ofthe complexity of immigration issues today. 102 It is also in line with the legislative 
98 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,265 (1990). 
99 !d. at 265. ("While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive suggests that "the people" protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments ... "). 
100 Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of Rights from Chinese Exclusion to Guantanamo, 20 
Berkeley La Raza L.J. 89 (2010)(" "All three branches of government do their own share of crafting immigration 
laws and policies. Together, about a century ago, they created this notion that some immigrants are more alien than 
others and repeated the same theme consistently throughout the last century."). 




102 See e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,219 (1982) (quoting Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1981) 
(testimony of William French Smith, Attorney General)("We have neither the resources, the capability, nor the 
motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of whom have become, in effect, members of the 
community."). 
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approach to deportable aliens, which includes provisions to cancel an alien's removal from the 
country based on the attainment of certain ties. 103 It would presumably create an incentive, 
similar to the one provided for by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996, for undocumented residents to maintain community presence and obey the nation's 
laws in the hope that these actions could someday be counted in their favor. Because of its 
resemblance to the current law (as well as others recently proposed)104, the sufficient connections 
test meets the expectations of those undocumented residents who are more familiar with the 
well-defined rules of immigration law than the vagaries of the Supreme Court's holdings. 
However, the sufficient connections test is not without its criticism. The dissenters in 
Verdugo- Urquidez assailed the uncertainty that inhered in the rule, stating: "The Court admits 
that "the people" extends beyond the citizenry, but leaves the precise contours of its "sufficient 
connection" test unclear."(Brennan, J., dissenting).105 Indeed, only the most self-assured 
undocumented resident would feel safe under that test; all others would be left with the nagging 
suspicion that their connections to the community might be someday deemed insufficient by a 
capricious judge. This uncertainty of course will not be confined only to those undocumented 
residents; law enforcement officers, for example, will also feel the pinch from this test. To them, 
this additional wrinkle in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will only add to the unease produced 
103 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(B)(1)(stating that the Attorney General may cancel removal of a deportable alien ifthe 
alien has been present in the United States for the last ten years, has been a person of good moral character, and 
establishes that removal would "result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, 
or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence."). 
104 See also Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 729, 111 th Cong. (2009)(proposing 
conditional permanent residency to certain illegal aliens who arrived in the country as minors, have graduated from 
high school, and maintain a good moral character.). 
105 See id. at 282. 
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by not knowing what course of action they can pursue when confronted with a suspect of 
ambiguous citizenship. 106 
Other critics have argued that the sufficient connections test "created an expansive gray 
area", which has led to inconsistent lower court rulings. 107 A brief look at a few examples of 
post-Verdugo cases will show that the sufficient connections test has shown itself to be of little 
predictive value for determining who will obtain the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In 
one case, the federal district court of Vermont ruled on the availability of the exclusionary rule 
for a Canadian citizen on a fraudulently-obtained visa arrested in a United States airport. 108 The 
court, granting in part the motion to suppress evidence that was the product of an illegal search, 
stated as a threshold issue that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the noncitizen because 
"the defendants presence in the United States was voluntary, and they had gained admission, 
albeit surreptitiously, for a temporary visit as tourists. Such connections ... constitute the type of 
connections which would vest in aliens the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment 
... "
109 That case can be contrasted to the decision of a Texas appellate court which upheld the 
conviction of a Colombian national who had been unlawfully present in the United States for two 
106 See e.g. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975)("In this case the officers relied on a single 
factor to justify stopping respondent's car: the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants. We cannot conclude that 
this furnished reasonable grounds to believe that the three occupants were aliens."). 
107 Douglas I. Koff, Post-Verdugo-Urquidez: The Sufficient Connection Test-Substantially Ambiguous, Substantially 
Unworkable, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 435, 471 (1994) ("Although it is easy to determine when an alien's 
connection has not reached the level of Verdugo-Urquidez's, it is difficult to determine whether the alien who has 
developed more of a connection with the United States than Verdugo-Urquidez is afforded Fourth Amendment 
protection."). 
108 United States v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789 (D. Vt. 1993) affd, 49 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1995). 
109 ld. at 793. 
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years. 110 Although the court's Verdugo analysis was ultimately not dispositive, it still stated that 
he would not have standing to challenge the search because he "had not been employed during 
his two years in the United States and was living off money given him by his brothers, who were 
convicted drug traffickers or charged with drug trafficking and on fugitive status." 111 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals itself produced an important case- one cited in the 
Portillo-Munoz dissent in arguing that Portillo-Munoz was one of"the people." 112 In Martinez-
Aguero v. Gonzalez, the court held that a Mexican citizen who crossed the border once a month 
had a Fourth Amendment right to pursue a remedy when she attempted to cross with a recently-
invalidated visa.113 The court agreed that "her regular and lawful entry of the United States 
pursuant to a valid border-crossing card and her acquiescence in the U.S. system of immigration 
constitute[ d] her voluntary acceptance of societal obligations, rising to the level of 'substantial 
connections. "'114 
One might criticize the Verdugo- Urquidez test for injecting more confusion into the area 
of constitutional rights. From the above cases, it is should be clear that there is little predictive 
value in the test. A foreign national who comes across the border for a few days under false 
no Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App. 1991) review granted in part, decision vacated, 825 S.W.2d 124 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 
lll /d. at 143. ("Appellant demonstrated no meaningful ties to the community and we do not find he is entitled to the 
protection accorded "We the people of the United States" as originally intended by the framers of either the federal 
or state constitutions."). 
Ill Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 445 (5th Cir. 2011. 
113 Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006). 
u
4 Id at 625. ("There may be cases in which an alien's connection with the United States is so tenuous that he 
cannot reasonably expect the protection of its constitutional guarantees; the nature and duration of Martinez-
Aguero's contacts with the United States, however, are sufficient to confer Fourth Amendment rights."). 
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pretenses is a member of"the people"115, while a two-year resident is not. 116 And a Mexican 
citizen who has never had any intention of developing any sort of substantial relationship with 
the United States becomes one of "the people" because her monthly acquiescence to Border 
Patrol could constitute her voluntary acceptance of societal obligations. The Verdugo- Urquidez 
Court's conflation of several distinct and potentially conflicting factors- the sufficient 
connections, the national community, the voluntary presence- may have made this test too 
complex for lower courts to apply consistently. 
B. "We the governed"- the test of the Verdugo-Urquidez dissent 
The dissenters in Verdgo-Urquidez, Justices Brennan and Marshall, proposed a broader 
and simpler test for determining who are "people" for the purposes of the Bill of Rights. They 
stated that Verdugo-Urquidez should be considered included in the protections because "our 
Government, by investigating him and attempting to hold him accountable under United States 
criminal laws, has treated him as a member of our community for purposes of enforcing our 
laws."117 The dissent admonished the rest of the court that whenever agents of the United States 
government seeks to enforce American criminal laws upon those outside the citizenry or the 
territoriality, they "in turn are obliged to respect certain correlative rights, among them the 
Fourth Amendment."118 The dissent thus opted for a much simpler rule that, if nothing else, 
prevents a headache to any undocumented resident, law enforcement officer, judge, or even 
frustrated law student trying impatiently to determine who is sufficiently connected to the United 
115 United States v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789 (D. Vt. 1993) affd, 49 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1995). 
116 Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App. 1991). 
117 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 at 284. 
118 I d. at 284. 
27 
States. Whenever the authority of the United States tries to govern him, the defendant 
"become[s], quite literally, one of the governed."119 
Besides the clear advantage of simplicity and predictive value, there are other reasons to 
approve of ''the governed" test of the dissent. At its most basic level, the rule appeals to a sense 
of"mutuality and fundamental fairness that are central to our Nation's constitutional 
conscience", that one might argue is often absent when it comes to considering the rights of 
noncitizens. 120 Perhaps it is the echo of the Golden Rule that rings true in the dissent's 
statement: "If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will 
obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and punish them."121 When viewed 
against such a statement of basic equity, any argument for denying rights to less-connected aliens 
seems unreasonable. 
The dissent also bolsters its argument with an appeal to the history, arguing that the 
majority was missing the forest for the trees in suggesting that such a right so fundamental to the 
founding of the country should be read narrowly. 122 Refusing to make a decision based solely on 
the social compact theory of the Constitution, Justice Brennan's dissent (and Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence)123 instead stated: "Thus, the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to 'create' 
119 Jd at 284. 
120 ld at 286. 
121 Jd at 284. 
122 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 at 287-88 ("Whereas the British Parliament was unconstrained, the Framers 
intended to create a Government of limited powers. Bestowing rights and delineating protected groups would have 
been inconsistent with the Drafters' fundamental conception of a Bill of Rights as a limitation on the Government's 
conduct with respect to all whom it seeks to govern."). 
123 Jd at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("A government may originate in the voluntary compact or assent of the 
people of several states .... But the difficulty in asserting it to be a compact between the people of each state, and all 
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rights. Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing rights 
and liberties presumed to be pre-existing."124 Ironically, this originalist focus, rejected by Justice 
Scalia in Verdugo-Urquidez for the Fourth Amendment, would twenty years later become his 
main selling point for striking down gun control laws when he stated: " ... it has always been 
widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified 
a pre-existing right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-
existence of the right and declares only that it shall not be infringed. 125 
The major critique of the dissent's "governed" rule is the refrain commonly delivered in 
response to such idealistic arguments- it is "impracticable."126 Justice Kennedy, for example, 
believed that the difficulties such as the "absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue 
warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy 
that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials"127 would make the Fourth 
Amendment potentially much harder to comply with abroad. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
plurality, took an even more pragmatic approach: "For better or for worse, we live in a world of 
nation-states in which our Government must be able to functio[ n] effectively in the company of 
sovereign nations."128 He continued: "Situations threatening to important American interests 
the people of the other states is, that the constitution itself contains no such expression, and no such designation of 
parties." (quoting Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution § 365, p. 335 (1833)). 
124 Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 at 288. 
125 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, further quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876)("[t]his is not a 
right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence."). 
126 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring)( citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 
(1957)(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
127 I d. at 278. 
128 Jd at 274, citing Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958). 
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may arise half-way around the globe, situations which in the view of the political branches of our 
Government require an American response with armed force." 129 This point of view would take 
on heightened importance after the attacks of September 11th, as courts began to question just 
how much constitutional protection should be afforded when dealing with alleged terrorists. 130 
In many cases, some protections of the Constitution were sacrificed to similar concerns of 
practicality. 131 
C. "Affirmative vs. passive right" test- Portillo-Munoz majority 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, while still holding that the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply to undocumented residents 132, did not rest its decision on the inapplicability of the 
Verdugo- Urquidez standard alone. The court, perhaps recognizing that it was treading on 
uncertain ground in such a strict reading of the "sufficient connections" test133, sought to 
distinguish its gun holding, of which there was no contradicting precedent, from its interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment, which was not supported by even its own precedent. 134 To shore up 
129 !d. at 274. 
130 See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,497-98 (2004)("Today, the Court springs a trap on the Executive, 
subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of the federal courts even though it has never before been thought to be 
within their jurisdiction-and thus making it a foolish place to have housed alien wartime detainees.). 
131 See e.g. Tung Yin, "Anything but Bush?": The Obama Administration and Guantanamo Bay, 34 HAR.v. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 453 (20 11) 
132 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (" ... neither this court nor the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment extends to a native and citizen of another nation who entered and remained in the United States 
illegally."). 
133 Note the unsure language: "Moreover, even if there were precedent for the proposition that illegal aliens 
generally are covered by the Fourth Amendment..." Id at 440. 
134 See e.g. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a Mexican citizen who had 
inadvertently attempted an unlawful border crossing still had sufficient connections to be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.). 
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its interpretation of the Second Amendment, the majority stated: " ... we do not find that the use 
of 'the people' in both the Second and the Fourth Amendment mandates a holding that the two 
amendments cover exactly the same groups of people."135 The court continued: "the purposes of 
the Second and the Fourth Amendment are different. The Second Amendment grants an 
affirmative right to keep and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a protective 
right against abuses by the government."136 Because of this difference in intention, the court 
reasoned that it was "reasonable that an affirmative right would be extended to fewer groups than 
would a protective right."137 One may criticize the Portillo-Munoz court's decision for its 
inconsistency. It says essentially: first, undocumented residents do not have Fourth Amendment 
rights or Second Amendment rights; but second, even if they do have Fourth Amendment rights, 
they do not have Second Amendment rights. 
But how strong is its argument that there is a difference between affirmative and passive 
rights? The majority's affirmative versus passive rights distinction may sound convincing at 
first blush for those who suspect deep down there is some difference between brandishing a gun 
and keeping the government out of your house. However, the Portillo-Munoz majority cites no 
support for this statement. In fact, this deceptively-simple statement comes from the 
Government's brief, which argued: "The Fourth Amendment is a passive, or defensive right that 
protects the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. In contrast, the Second 
Amendment codifies an affirmative right to use arms. Accordingly, one cannot define the scope 
135 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
136 ld at 440-41. 
137 Id at 441. 
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of the Second Amendment by analogy to the Fourth."138 For the first half of its proposition, the 
Government cites Verdugo-Urquidez 139; for the second half, it cites Heller's focus on "law-
abiding, responsible citizens"140• However, when one searches for a reference to the "affirmative 
right" of the Second Amendment, one finds that it does not appear until much later, deep into the 
dissent of Heller. Justice Stevens, dissenting vigorously141 from the Court's new vindication of 
the Second Amendment as a personal right, states, "by way of contrast, the Fourth Amendment 
describes a right against governmental interference rather than an affirmative right to engage in 
protected conduct, and so refers to a right to protect a purely individual interest."142 This 
dissenting opinion is the source of the textual support that the Government argues, and the 
Portillo-Munoz majority subsequently ratifies into Fifth Circuit law. While a lower court is 
skating on thin ice whenever it decides a case based on the dissenting opinion of a Supreme 
Court ruling, the situation is even more suspect when that dissenting opinion runs contrary to the 
138 Id at 9-10. 
139 Jd at 10, citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 266. ("the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the 
people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government.") 
140 Jd at 10, citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
141 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 678,666, 648, 639.652 (referring to the majority's analysis as being "simply wrong", 
"without any real analysis", "fundamentally fail[ing] to grasp the point", and "feeble." Perhaps most damning, 
Justice Stevens also states "not a word in the constitutional text even arguably supports the Court's overwrought and 
novel description of the Second Amendment.")(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
142 !d. at 646. 
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majority opinion that the lower court is purporting to affirm. 143 The Fifth Circuit uses the Heller 
majority opinion144 for the ruling, and the antithetical dissent145 for the rationale. 
Thus the primary disadvantage to the "affirmative versus passive right" test is that it 
apparently lacks any sort of precedential support, even in its own circuit. 146 On this basis alone, 
it seems unlikely that any other court would use such a rule. A judge who used such a rule in a 
future determination on some other provision of the Bill of Rights would be vulnerable to 
criticism that he or she was ruling subjectively. If the Supreme Court has repeatedly established 
that the concurrently-passed amendments in the Bill of Rights refer to the same people147, then 
absent any newly-discovered historical evidence, it would seem arbitrary to pick and choose 
those that will apply only to citizens. This outcome seems irreconcilable with the idea of a 
Constitution as creating "a government of laws, and not of men."148 The "affirmative versus 
passive right" test also opens up the door to the possibility that future courts could strip away 
more rights from noncitizens simply by designating them as "affirmative," and not "passive." 
143 See also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 ("it suggests that 'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, refers to a class of persons ... "); See also Heller, 554 U.S. at 579, citing the same. 
144 ld at 595 ("There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment 
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms."). 
145 Heller, 554 U.S. at 645 ("it is the collective action of individuals having a duty to serve in the militia that the text 
directly protects and, perhaps more importantly, that the ultimate purpose of the Amendment was to protect the 
States' share of the divided sovereignty created by the Constitution.")(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
146 See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227-28 (5th Cir. 200l)("There is no evidence in the text of the 
Second Amendment, or any other part of the Constitution, that the words 'the people' have a different connotation 
within the Second Amendment than when employed elsewhere in the Constitution. In fact, the text of the 
Constitution, as a whole, strongly suggests that the words 'the people' have precisely the same meaning within the 
Second Amendment as without."). 
147 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 579; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
148 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
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For example, due process, though guaranteed to noncitizens since 1886149, might still be 
someday deemed "affirmative" under this test if certain provisions of due process require some 
active participation of the defendant. 
D. The intermediate-scrutiny test 
One of the major questions that the Heller majority left unanswered is what standard of 
review should be applied when reviewing gun legislation. 150 Rather than go into too much 
review of the standards applied by courts when determining if legislation is constitutional151 , it 
suffices to say that the Heller majority pointedly refused to decide on what level of review was 
being used to strike down the District of Columbia gun law as unconstitutional, instead stating: 
"Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, 
banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of 
one's home and family, would fail constitutional muster."152 In a footnote, Justice Scalia added 
that rational basis would be especially inappropriate as a standard of review, as the gun law was 
149 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369 (1886)("The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not 
confmed to the protection of citizens."). 
150 See e.g. Jason T. Anderson, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered 
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 547, 547-48 (2009)("But the Court left the door open for a new 
debate to begin in the Second Amendment context what standard of review applies to legislation that restricts an 
individual's right to bear arms?"). 
151 For a more thorough discussion on the standards of review and how they have been applied to gun laws after 
Heller, See e.g. Sarah Perkins, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Shoots One Down, 70 LA. L. 
REv. 1061, 1074 (2010)("The Supreme Court traditionally uses three levels of constitutional scrutiny-rationality 
review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny-in evaluating claims that a person's constitutional rights have been 
infringed. Each of these three levels of constitutional scrutiny contains two prongs in its analysis. The first prong 
determines the government interest in a particular regulation at issue, while the second prong examines the 
connection between the government interest and the regulation."). 
152 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,628-29. 
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within the scope of the Bill of Rights. 153 The dissent criticized the majority for this purposeful 
omission: "How is a court to determine whether a particular firearm regulation (here, the 
District's restriction on handguns) is consistent with the Second Amendment? What kind of 
constitutional standard should the court use? How high a protective hurdle does the Amendment 
erect? The question matters." 154 Justice Breyer, in dissent, instead argues for a balancing-test to 
weigh the interests of the government against the constitutionally protected right of the people. 155 
However, the majority firmly rejects such a test as inconsistent with the Court's past treatment of 
constitutional rights. 156 
As a result, lower courts have been inconsistent in determining what level of review is 
now appropriate when ruling on the constitutionality of §922(g) post-Heller.157 Some courts 
have continued to apply rational basis, finding that Heller "specifically stated the particular 
153 !d. at 629 ("But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws under 
constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws .... Obviously, the same test could not 
be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of 
speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.")(referencing 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938) ("There may be narrower scope for operation 
of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments ... "). 
154/d. at 687-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
155 /d. at 689-90 ("I would simply adopt such an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly. The fact that important 
interests lie on both sides of the constitutional equation suggests that review of gun-control regulation is not a 
context in which a court should effectively presume either constitutionality (as in rational-basis review) or 
unconstitutionality (as in strict scrutiny). Rather, where a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally 
protected interests in complex ways, the Court generally asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a 
way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon other important governmental 
interests.)(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
156 /d. at 634 ("We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a 
freestanding "interest-balancing" approach."). 
157 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F .3d at 443 (commenting that courts of appeal have taken various approaches to scrutinizing 
laws regarding firearms, including a substantial burden test, declining to label the level of scrutiny being applied, 
applying a sliding scale test, and intermediate scrutiny)(Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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regulations were constitutional, as regarding felons and the mentally ill, § 922(g)(l) and (4), or 
via analogy to the so called 'presumptively lawful regulations. "'158 Nevertheless, the most 
common approach has been to uphold different provisions of the federal gun law under some 
form of intermediate scrutiny.159 Situated between rational basis and strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny is a "flexible standard [that] generally requires the government to establish that the 
challenged law is substantially related to an important governmental interest."160 
The primary advantage to using such a test is that it takes real account of the complexity 
of the current issue, and does make its case solely on the obscure and ambiguous intentions of a 
generation long past. For the question of undocumented residents and firearms, for example, this 
test profits greatly from the fact that our conceptions have dramatically changed over the past 
couple centuries from when both immigration and gun laws were of a much different scale. The 
intermediate scrutiny test would take into account, to give just one example, the difficulty in 
firearm registration for a group of people who generally lack valid documentation. The other 
standards ignore such a critical practical issue when deciding Second Amendment rights. A 
judge might decide to examine any of the myriad other governmental interests which might 
158 United States v. Chester, 367 F. App'x 392, 396-97, reh'g granted (Dec. 30, 2010), opinion vacated on reh'g, 628 
F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010)(nevertheless concluding that intermediate scrutiny was more appropriate because Court 
dicta could not control every gun challenge). 
159 /d. at 443, n. 4 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although it should be noted that several 
appellate courts, while still using intermediate scrutiny, have found creative ways to rework the standard. See e.g. In 
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir.2010)(developing "a two-prong analysis to determine whether a 
regulation violates a defendant's Second Amendment right to bear arms. A district court must first determine 
whether the right sought to be regulated is within the scope of the Second Amendment's protection .... If the district 
court fmds that the right is protected by the Second Amendment, the court ... should apply intermediate scrutiny to 
determine whether "there is a reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and a substantial government 
objective." /d. at 683 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
160 United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2009) reh'g en bane granted, opinion vacated, 08-3770, 
2010 WL 1267262 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010) and on reh'g en bane, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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ultimately be dispositive. For example, the Government in a brief for one case offered this 
justification for keeping guns out of the hands of noncitizens: "Defense of the State or the 
community, is a duty peculiar to the citizen .... The alien who has not declared an intention to 
become a citizen has no obligation to defend the State or the community."161 Such a statement is 
of course no longer true, both in light of Heller's new pronouncement of individual (and not 
militia) gun ownership162, as well as the strong encouragement of noncitizens to serve in the 
United States Armed Forces. 163 
Under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, a court could no longer ask merely "whether the 
challenged law is a reasonable method of regulating the right to bear arms."164 For example: "If 
a state attempted to disarm its citizenry completely, such a law might well survive rational basis 
review, assuming the goal is public safety and that a rational legislator could conclude that 
banning all firearms furthers public safety."165 If we analogize this example to the case of 
noncitizens, we find such a law exists in the form of§ 922(g)(5), and courts have routinely 
upheld it as rational. But because under intermediate scrutiny "the government bears the burden 
161 Brief for Respondent at 9-10, State v. Hemandez-Mercado, 879 P.2d 283 (Wash. 1994), No. 60220-4. 
162 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 ("There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second 
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms."). 
163 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1439 (West)("A person who has served honorably at any time in the armed forces of the United 
States for a period or periods aggregating one year ... may be naturalized without having resided, continuously 
immediately preceding the date of filing such person's application, in the United States for at least five years .... "); 
See also Who Must Register Chart, Selective Service System (Dec. 4, 20 11 ), 
http://www.sss.gov/PDFs!WhoMustRegisterChart.pdf (showing that the Selective Service Act requires that virtually 
all male citizens and aliens, even those who are undocumented, must register for the United States draft upon their 
18th birthday.). 
164 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 717 (2007). 
165 Id. at 717. 
37 
of justifying its regulation in the context of heightened scrutiny review," 166 courts will now be 
required to examine those stereotypes of undocumented residents that led to the passage of such 
gun laws and see if they have any basis in reality. 167 For some at least, an objective look at facts 
and statistics may yield a surprise and a new perspective on immigration in the United States 
today. To give just one example, studies have shown that native-born Americans are 
significantly more likely to be incarcerated than those born abroad, including those who migrate 
here illegally. 168 A court, when presented with such statistics, may find that the public safety 
justification for the firearm ban for undocumented residents no longer carries as much force. 
IV. Conclusion 
There are primarily two lines of decisions in recent court holdings denying 
undocumented residents gun rights. The first type of decision presumes that Heller decided that 
the Second Amendment applies only to United States citizens, and anyone outside of the group 
could not be counted as a member of"the people."169 The second type presumes that U.S.C. 
§922(g) is constitutional as a "longstanding prohibition" that is a "presumptively lawful 
166 United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010). 
167 See e.g. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 'The People' of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear 
Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1521, 1527 (2010)("showcas[ing] the ways in which citizenship restrictions in the firearms 
context have operated as a proxy for racial discrimination, helped construct sinister versions of the foreign 'other' 
unfit to wield arms, and contributed to the indeterminacy of citizenship's content."). 
168 See e.g. United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, No. 3:08-CR-145-MR-DCK-1, 2008 WL 4539663 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 
2008)(referencing Ruben G. Rumbaut & Walter A. Ewing, The Myth of Immigrant Criminality and the Paradox of 
Assimilation: Incarceration Rates among Native and Foreign-Born Men (Immigration Policy Center, Spring 2007)( 
"In contrast to felons and those previously found to be seriously mentally ill, persons "illegally or unlawfully in the 
United States" are no more likely than persons legally in the United States to commit violent crimes.") 
169 See e.g. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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regulatory measure[] .... "170 Some decisions, like the recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case 
of United States v. Portillo-Muniz, employ both philosophies. However, neither approach is 
correct. 
The Supreme Court's landmark decision, to be sure, represented a "dramatic upheaval in 
the law."171 It did, in fact, as the dissent predicted, "throw into doubt the constitutionality of gun 
laws throughout the United States."172 However, what it did not do was strip away the rights of 
noncitizens for the purposes of the Second Amendment (as well as the identically-worded First 
and Fourth Amendments). 173 Though some have suggested that this may represent Justice 
Scalia's ulterior motive in the Heller decision, 174 such a broad and momentous holding cannot 
and should not be read into a few words of dicta. Despite the Portillo-Munoz court's erroneous 
interpretation, the Supreme Court has not overruled the Verdugo- Urquidez "sufficient 
170 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
171 I d. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
172 Jd. at 722 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
173 Id at 580, incorrectly citing Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 ("What is more, in all six other provisions of the 
Constitution that mention 'the people,' the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, 
not an unspecified subset. As we said in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez ... '[T]he people' seems to have been a 
term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution .... [that] refers to a class of persons who are part of a 
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part 
of that community.")(Emphasis added). 
174 See Gulasekaram, supra fn. 172 at 1536. ("Second, Scalia's formulation of"the people" in Heller contradicts, 
while purporting to affirm, Verdugo-Urquidez's defmition. Citing Verdugo-Urquidez, the Heller majority suggests 
that it adopts that opinion's understanding that "the people" meant "all members of the political community." This 
misquotation of the prior opinion appears to be a sleight of hand intended to constrict the constitutional defmition of 
"the people." Reformulating membership with a "political" rather than a "national" lens is significant because the 
former implies only those with political rights--e.g., voting, public office--while the latter is malleable, potentially 
including all who believe in the ideals of, and are connected to, the nation."); See also Charles Sullivan, Professor, 
Seton Hall Law, Hidden Legacies of the Supreme Court's 2010-2011 Employment Decisions (Oct. 24, 2011) ("For 
every big juicy worm Scalia gives you, he always hides a hook in his opinions."). 
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connections" holding. The Verdugo- Urquidez standard therefore remains the primary test of 
who will be counted among "the people" of the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, any constitutional right, fundamental or otherwise, may still have 
reasonable restrictions imposed upon it. 175 The Heller decision commands that, for better or 
worse, gun control laws must now pass some higher level of scrutiny than was previously 
applied. 176 Courts should continue to uphold some restrictions in U.S.C. §922(g), such as that 
which prevents former felons from owning firearms as being substantially related to an important 
government purpose. Indeed, some restrictions should in fact be tightened, when they are found 
not to be doing enough to support public safety. 177 For other restrictions, such as those that 
prevent undocumented residents from owning firearms solely because of their status, courts may 
have a more difficult time establishing the relationship between the group and the 
"fundamental"178 right at stake. 
The Supreme Court once noted: " The legislative history [of the firearms act] ... supports 
the view that Congress sought to rule broadly to keep guns out of the hands of those who have 
175 See e.g. United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010), citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 791,(1989X"[G]overnment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of 
protected speech .... "). 
176 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
177 See e.g. Michael Luo, Felons Finding It Easy to Regain Gun Rights. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/us/felons-fmding-it-easy-to-regain-gun-rights.html?_r=1&ref=us. ("Yet every 
year, thousands of felons across the country have those rights reinstated, often with little or no review. In several 
states, they include people convicted of violent crimes, including first-degree murder and manslaughter, an 
examination by The New York Times has found."). 
178 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010). 
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demonstrated that they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to 
society."179 Twenty-five years later, when we read stories in the newspaper about new state laws 
that are "intended to drive illegal immigrants from the state by making every aspect of their life 
difficult" 180 we begin to appreciate that maybe the question we should be asking is not "Are 
undocumented residents a threat to our society," but instead, "Is our society becoming a threat to 
them?l81 
179 Scarborough v. U.S., 43I U.S. 563,572 (1977). 
180 See e.g. Campbell Robertson, Critics See 'Chilling Effect' in Alabama Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 
20 I I, http://www .nytimes.com/20 I III 0/28/us/alabama-immigration-laws-critics-question-
target.html?_r=I&src=recg. ("The champions of Alabama's far-reaching immigration law have said that it is 
intended to drive illegal immigrants from the state by making every aspect of their life difficult."). 
181 See The Twilight Zone: The Monsters Are Due on Maple Street. (CBS television broadcast Mar. 4, I 960)("There 
are weapons that are simply thoughts, attitudes, prejudices, to be found only in the minds of men. For the record, 
prejudices can kill and suspicion can destroy .... ") 
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